Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1992

State of Utah v. Mikel Shane Miller : Petition for
Writ of Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald S. Fujino; Charles F. Loyd, Jr.; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; J. Kevin Murphy; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Miller, No. 920255.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4218

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

i 11 i i I • I I V I i\ I

UTAH

UK

DOCUMENT

b

W

MML

UTAH SUPREME CO^

KFU
45.9

BRIEF

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE WKftJ«8.2Z£25!?
MIKEL SHANE MILLER,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Supreme Cour;
Case No.
%?0<Q35

v.
Court of Appeals
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.

Case No. 910071-CA

Priority No. 13

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari arises out of an
appeal from a judgment and conviction for Burglary, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-202 (1990), and
Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section
76-6-404 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge,
presiding.
RONALD S. FUJINO
CHARLES F. LOYD, JR.
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Petitioner/Appellant
R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
J. KEVIN MURPHY
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
r—•

Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee

a

i

r I L £

U

MAY 2 0 1992
CLERK SUPREME C O ' , c ~

„,le

*26

Cnae No.
ajE(^JjlKT_liOH_rM\IIlQli^Oyi_-WIUT^

The following headlines and other iequJremenls nee derived
from Rules 45 through 51 of Lhe Utah Rules or Appellate Procedure.
^

DEADLINES FOR FILING
1.

Petition: JCLjclays a Tier entry oT decision of Court
of Appeals, or decision on petition for
rehearing.
Cross-petition: 30 days after service or petition.
Respondent: 30 days after service of petition.
Reply brief: no deadline.

2.
3.
4.

y

TEN COPIES
LENGTH (unless permission to exceed has been granted)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Petitioner
Opposition
Amicus
Reply Urief

20_pages
2Q_pages
2_0_pages
5 pages

PRINT AND COVER REQU1REMENTS
1.
2.

Ten characters per inch; double spacing
Color:
Petitioner
White
Respondent
Orange
Reply
Yellow

CONTENT REQUIREMENTS

y
LS

2

1/

3

yy

4

\S

5

\y

6

\S

7
0

xJ
•/
\y

\y

9

List of all parties unless appearing in caption.
Table of contents witli page references.
Table of authorities with page references.
Questions presented for review. (Petitioner only)
Citation to opinion of Court of Appeals (Petitioner only)
Statement of jurisdiction (Petitioner only).
Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, and rules
(Petitioner only).
Statement oT case
Argument.

(Petitioner only).

11

Appendix: Court of Appeals and Jower court decisions.
Attorney Signature.

12

Proof of Service

]0

(Attorney's signature required).

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MIKEL SHANE MILLER,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Supreme Court
Case No.

v.
Court of Appeals
Case No. 910071-CA

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.

Priority No. 13

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari arises out of an
appeal from a judgment and conviction for Burglary, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-202 (1990), and
Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section
76-6-404 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge,
presiding.
RONALD S. FUJINO
CHARLES F. LOYD, JR.
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Petitioner/Appellant
R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
J. KEVIN MURPHY
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

11

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

2

JURISDICTION

2

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
DISCOUNTED THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH THE TRIAL COURT
DETERMINED WERE COERCIVE.

4

POINT II. PETITIONER PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT.

8

POINT III. THE NEBULOUS "TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST SHOULD BE REPLACED BY A
CLEARER STATE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD.

12

REASONS JUSTIFYING THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT

19

CONCLUSION

19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES CITED
Ashbv V. State. 354 N.E.2d 192 (1976)

17

Bram v. United States. 168 U.S. 532 (1897)

12, 14, 15,
16, 17

Colorado v. Connelly. 479 U.S. 157 (1986)

5, 7

Fex v. State. 386 So.2d 58 (Fla. App. 1980)

17

Gunsbv v. Wainwriqht. 596 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert, denied. 444 U.S. 946 (1979)
Mallov v. Hoqan. 378 U.S. 1 (1964)

17
5, 6, 12,
16, 17

Massachusetts v. Upton. 466 U.S. 727 (1984)

10

McLallen v. Wvrick. 498 F.Supp. 137 (W.D. Mo. 1980)

., .

People v. Conte. 365 N.W.2d 648 (Mich. 1984)

17
16

People v. Jones. 331 N.W.2d 406 (1982), cert, denied.
460 U.S. 1084 (1983)

17

State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991) . . .
State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1272 (Utah App. 1990)
State v. Breckenridqe. 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983)

10, 13
....

State v. Capwell. 669 P.2d 808 (Or. App. 1983)
State v. Crank. 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943)

11

11
15, 16

...

8, 9, 10,
12

State v. Earl. 716 P. 2d 803 (Utah 1986)

11

State v. Franklin. 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987)
State v. Griffin. 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1990)

• •
11

18
....

5

Page
State v. Hegelman. 717 P.2d 1348 (Utah 1986)

6

State v. Holland. 777 P. 2d 1019 (Utah 1989)

18

State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987)

9

State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988)

10

State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)

17

State v. McDermott. 554 A.2d 1302 (N.H. 1989)

16

State v. Mendacino. 603 P.2d 1376 (Or. 1979)

16

State v. Miller. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App. 1992).
State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991)
State v. Singer. 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991)

passim
17

....

1, 6, 7,
8

State v. Strain. 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 1989)
State v. Thompson. 760 P.2d 1162 (Idaho 1988)

12, 16
12

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
U.S. Const, amend. V

7

Utah Const, art. I, § 12

10, 16

Utah Const, art. I, § 14

14, 18

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5)

2

Utah R. App. P. 49(6) (D)

2

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Bradley, Martha, Hide and Seek; Children on the
Underground. 51 Utah Hist. Q. 133 (1983)

iii

13, 14, 15

Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah
Courts, Utah B. J. 25, 26 (Vol. 2, No. 9 November
1989)

.

Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government—The
History of Utah's Constitution, 1966 Utah L. Rev.
311
Note, The Compelled Confession; A Case Against
Admissibility, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 800 (1985) . . .
Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure
Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article I,
Section 14, 17 Utah J. contemp. L. 267 (1991) . . . .

iv

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MIKEL SHANE MILLER,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Supreme Court
Case No.

v.
Court of Appeals
Case No. 910071-CA

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.

Priority No. 13

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether a conflict in the court of appeals exists

because the decision in the case at bar, which focused primarily on
the characteristics of an accused who confessed, now erroneously
conflicts with State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991), a
decision rendering irrelevant the defendant's personal
characteristics.
2.

Did the court of appeals err in refusing to address

Petitioner's state constitutional argument, where the applicable
state constitutional provision and case authority was cited to the
trial court and developed on appeal?
3.

Does the Utah Constitution allow this Court to adopt

a standard clearer than the federal, "totality of the circumstances"
test used for determining the voluntariness of a confession?

OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The court of appeals' decision, State v. Miller, 183 Utah
Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App. 1992), is contained in Appendix 1 of this
petition.
JURISDICTION
On March 24, 1992, the court of appeals issued State v.
Miller. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App. 1992).

Petitioner Miller

then requested and received a thirty day extension of time to file
the petition.

Utah Code Ann. sections 78-2-2(3)(a), -(5) (1992),

confers jurisdiction upon this Court.

See also Utah R. App. P.

49(6)(D).
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following constitutional and
statutory provisions are contained in Appendix 2:
Utah R. App. P. 46(d)
Utah R. App. P. 48
Utah R. App. P. 49(6)(D)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a), -(5)
Utah Const, art. I, section 12
Utah Const, art. I, section 14
Or. Const, art. I, seciton 12
U.S. Const, amend. V
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 7, 1991, following a bench trial before the
Honorable Scott Daniels, Defendant/Appellant/Petitioner Mikel Shane
Miller was convicted of burglary, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990), and theft, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-404
(1990).

The trial court had also previously denied Mr. Miller's

motion to suppress. Motion to Suppress Hearing [hereinafter "MS"]
at 45 (December 17, 1990).
The court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of zero
to five years in the Utah State Prison and ordered him to pay
restitution for the burglary conviction.

(R 37).

The court imposed

the same sentence and restitution order for the theft conviction.
(R 38).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner Miller agrees with the "Facts" section of the
involved opinion.

See State v. Miller, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 40-41

(Utah App. 1992).

Supplementary facts, which were not referred to

by the opinion, but are contained in the record, are also included
in this petition.
Mikel Miller did not understand the federal system and
its interrelationship with state charges.

(MS 26).

Based on

officer Chilton's representations and before any incriminating
statements or actions materialized, Miller told the officer, "I
don't want to put my neck on the line and go through all of this for
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nothing, [I don't want] to incriminate myself if there if going to
be no end product . . . "

(MS 23).

Miller may have "actively

participated" in the process, but the fact remains that absent the
Detective's assurances, Miller would not have confessed.

(MS 22-24).

The court of appeals' opinion also included other
relevant factual findings:
There is no doubt in my mind [the trial court's]
there was some indication of leniency given to the
defendant [Mikel Miller] here. . . .
I think that what the officer [Chilton] told Mr.
Miller in the jail was . . . "listen, I am close to
the prosecutor. He generally will accept my
recommendations. If you can help us we will see
what you can produce and I will do the best I can to
get him to file misdemeanor charges.

I [the court] assume [officer Chilton] also told him
[Miller] he was facing federal charges and that that
was in some way a coercion. . . . I find that he
had been in jail three or four days, which is a
substantial time, and that indicates to some extent
there is some coercion.
See Miller. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 42 n.l.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISCOUNTED THE
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED WERE
COERCIVE
In State v. Miller, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App.
1992), the court of appeals acknowledged the following coercive
circumstances as found by the trial court:
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"the threat of federal

charges, the promises of leniency and the length of his [Mikel
Miller's] stay in jail prior to the interrogation were evidence of
'impermissible' coercion."

183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40. These

circumstances were not, as the court of appeals claimed, merely
"potentially coercive 'details of the interrogation.'"
(emphasis added).

Id. at 41

The trial court specifically determined that such

circumstances were coercive.

See id. (the circumstances "were

evidence of 'impermissible' coercion").

Concluding that coercion

existed from one or all three of the circumstances is far different
than considering all three circumstances and then concluding that,
overall, there was no coercion.
The court of appeals erred by unduly emphasizing the
characteristics particular to Mr. Miller to the exclusion of the
already determined circumstances of police coerciveness.

Even

though a person may be "fully aware of the possible effect of a
confession[,]" 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41, if the confession resulted
from coercive threats, or promises, or an improper setting (or all
of the above), the confession was still improperly obtained.

Cf.

State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1990) (the accused may
have known what he was doing, but his confession was still
involuntary because it was given in response to a detective's
threats to, inter alia, separate him from his daughter); Mallov v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) ("We have held inadmissible even a
confession secured by so mild a whip as the refusal, under certain
circumstances, to allow a suspect to call his wife until he
confessed"); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (being
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fully aware of the possible effect of a confession is not a
prerequisite to determining the voluntariness of a confession)•
The appropriate focus should have remained on whether the
evidence "reveal[ed] some physical or psychological force or
manipulation that [was] designed to induce the accused to talk when
he otherwise would not have done so."

State v. Hegelman. 717 P.2d

1348, 1350 (Utah 1986) (using a "totality of the circumstances"
standard); Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8 ("Governments, state and federal,
are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence
independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a
charge against an accused out of his own mouth").
If a person's "intelligence" and "familiarity with the
legal system" could in fact negate police coerciveness, the Miller
decision could conceivably preclude a ruling of "coercion" when ever
an "intelligent" person familiar with the legal system was
involved.

Not only would former convicts be effected, but all

persons knowledgable in law (e.g. [former] police officers, lawyers,
legislators) could never be coerced—regardless of the nature of the
threats, or promises, or the coerciveness of the setting.
Instead of emphasizing the defendant's individual
characteristics, another panel of the court of appeals has focused
on the "coercive tactics [of] government agents."

State v. Singer,

815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991) (attached as Appendix 3).

In Singer,

the court discounted Singer's claim "that his peculiar background
and lack of socialization, stemming in part from home education,
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rendered him uniquely susceptible to subtle coercion and made him
extremely guillible."

818 P.2d at 1310.

The essence of Singer's claim of involuntariness is
that his free will was overcome by the agents as they
conversed regarding their families. The United States
Supreme Court, in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157
(1986), eschewed a "free will" analysis of
voluntariness of confessions. The Court stated that
the sole concern underlying the Fifth Amendment is
coercive tactics by government agents. Id. at 169-70.
The Court explained: "Miranda protects defendants
against government coercion leading them to surrender
rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no
further than that." Id. at 170-71.
Singerr 818 P.2d at 1310-11 (emphasis in original).
Since the trial court below determined that Detective
Chilton used coercive tactics, the court of appeals went too far in
over emphasizing Miller's "will" and intellect.

See Colorado v.

Connelly- 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (it is improper to conclude "that
a defendant's mental condition, by itself and apart from its
relation to official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry
into constitutional 'voluntariness'").
The Singer opinion, which rejected Singer's claim that his
confession was "involuntary due to his peculiar personal
characteristics[,]" Singer, 815 P.2d at 1309 (emphasis added),
conflicts directly with the Miller opinion, which accepted the
State's claim that Miller's confession was voluntary due to his
personal characteristics.

Miller. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41.

Thus, different panels of the court of appeals have applied
inconsistent and varied analysis.

On the one hand, a court of
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appeals' panel has discounted an accused's characteristics when they
seemed helpful to his defense.

See Singer, 815 P.2d 1303.

On the

other hand, a different court of appeals' panel has emphasized the
accused characteristics when they seemed helpful to the prosecution.
Miller, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 40. Such a double-edged sword led to a
conflict in the required analysis for determining the voluntariness
of a confession.
POINT II
PETITIONER PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
ARGUMENT
In State v. Miller. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App. 1992),
the court of appeals recognized that petitioner Miller "cited the
case of State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943) in his
Memorandum Supporting Defendant's Motion to Suppress."

183 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 42. However, the Miller court "refuse[d] to adopt such
a broad rule that would preserve an issue for appeal by merely
citing to a case without accompanying argument."

Id.

The language contained in Crank, though, was directly
applicable to the promises and threats in the case at bar:
When the state seeks to put the confession before the
jury it must establish its competency to the court.
To do this it must show that the confession was given
by the accused as his voluntary act; as an expression
of his independent and free will, uninfluenced by fear
of punishment or by hope of reward; that it was not
induced or influenced by any advantages or benefits
that might accrue to him or those near or dear to him,
nor was it given to lighten any penalties or
punishments the law might impose on him if tried and
convicted without confessing; and that it was not
given as a result of a desire to escape or avoid any
misery, threats, acts, or conduct of any other person.
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having it in their power, or whom he believed had it
in their power, to inflict upon him, or upon those
whom it was his duty or privilege to protect.
Crank, 142 P.2d at 184 (emphasis added).
Crank also cited numerous examples, similar to the case at
bar, in which "the language in each mentioned was held to be an
inducement sufficient to exclude a confession or statement made in
consequence thereof:"
It will be better for you to make a full
disclosure. . . . I don't think the truth will hurt
anybody. It will be better for you to come out and
tell all you know about it, if you feel that
way. . . . Edmund, if you know anything, it may be
best for you to tell it; or Edmund, if you know
anything, go and tell it, and it may be best for
you. . . . It will go better with you to tell where
the money is. All I want is my money, and if you will
tell me where it is, I will not prosecute you
hard. . . . It will be better for you to tell the
truth, and have no more trouble about it. . . . You
had better tell the truth. . . . It will be better
for you to confess. . . . it would be better to tell
the prosecuting witness all about it, and that the
officer thought the prosecuting witness would withdraw
the prosecution, or make it as light as
possible. . . . If you are guilty, I would advise you
to make an honest confession. It might be easier for
you. It is plain against you. . . . You had as well
tell all about it.
Crank, 142 P.2d at 189 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
In State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987), this Court
held, "A proper objection need not cite a case; it need only fairly
apprise the trial judge of the essence of the objection."
at 1075.

Id.

Petitioner Miller did more than "nominally allude" to the

Utah Constitution.

He cited the applicable state constitutional
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provision and provided a case, Crank, in support of his state
constitutional argument.

The language in Crank and its reference to

article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution sufficiently apprised
the trial court of his state constitutional argument.

Cf.

Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 736 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted) ("The proper sequence is to analyze
the state's law, including its constitutional law, before reaching a
federal constitutional claim.

This is required, not for the sake

either of parochialism or of style, but because the state does not
deny any right claimed under the federal Constitution when the claim
before the court in fact is fully met by state law"); Durham,
Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah Courts. Utah B. J. 25,
26 (Vol. 2, No. 9 November 1989) (Utah's appellate courts have used
the "primacy" approach in which the state constitutional analysis is
first considered).
Alternatively, in the past, appellate courts have expressed
reluctance to address state constitutional arguments when they have
not been briefed on appeal, as opposed to not being briefed at trial:
Because defendant provides no independent state
constitutional analysis, we decline to reach his
challenge to the state constitution. See, e.g., State
v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) ("As
a general rule, we will not engage in state
constitutional analysis unless an argument for
different analyses under the state and federal
constitutions is briefed."); Bobo, 803 P.2d at 1272
(Utah App. 1990) ("Until such time as attorneys heed
the call of the appellate courts of this state to more
fully brief and argue the application of the state
constitution . . . we cannot meaningfully play our
part in the judicial labratory of autonomous state
constitutional law development.") (citations omitted).
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State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 927 n.13 (Utah App. 1991).
In Mr. Miller's appeal, both the State and Petitioner
addressed and briefed the state constitutional argument.
offered a "historical" and "sister state" analysis.
Point III.

Miller

See infra

The state constitutional issue was properly before the

court of appeals for its consideration.
Furthermore, the "exceptional circumstances" exception
should apply to this case.

Petitioner offered a unique state

constitutional analysis which affected his liberty interests.

"The

general rule that constitutional issues not raised at trial cannot
be raised on appeal is excepted to when a person's liberty is at
stake."

State v. Breckenridae. 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983).

A

state constitutional analysis in the context of criminal appeals may
fall under one of the few "exceptional circumstances" which have
been actively encouraged by Utah's appellate courts:
despite our willingness to independently interpret
Utah's constitution in other areas of the law, the
analysis of state constitutional issues in criminal
appeals continues to be ignored. It is imperative
that Utah lawyers brief this Court on relevant state
constitutional questions.
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted).
A different state constitutional argument for determining the
voluntariness of a confession should be considered.
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POINT III
THE NEBULOUS "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST
SHOULD BE REPLACED BY A CLEARER STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD
The State acknowledged that State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332,
142 P.2d 178 (1943), "relied heavily on Bram fv. United States. 168
U.S. 532 (1897).]"

Appellee's brief at 18.

Petitioner Miller's use

of Crank as the catalyst for his Bram-like state constitutional law
standard is supported by the uniqueness of Utah's history and by a
"sister state" analysis.
Petitioner's proposed standard contains guidelines
understandable to police officers and is easily implemented in the
trial courts.

"[T]he confession . . . must not be extracted by any

sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied
promises, however, slight, nor by the exertion of any improper
influence."
1, 7 (1964).

Bram. 168 U.S. 532 cited in Mallov v. Hocran, 378 U.S.
Bram was decided in 1897, a time almost

contemporaneous with the creation of Utah's 1896 constitution.
Although the Miller opinion correctly noted that this court
in State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 1989), "declined to follow a
strict per se rule[,]" the nonbinding dicta was said in the context
of a federal analysis.
was not precluded.

A different state constitutional analysis

Cf. State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1164

(Idaho 1988) (citation omitted) ("Long gone are the days when state
courts will blindly apply United States Supreme Court interpretation
and methodology when in the process of interpreting their own
constitutions").

- 12 -

Utah's constitutional history "differs somewhat from the
history and experience of her sister states . . . [and] must be
weighed in light of Utah's unusual history and experience with the
statehood process and with the process of drafting a fundamental
charter of government."

Flynn, Federalism and Viable State

Government—The History of Utah's Constitution. 1966 Utah L. Rev.
311, 314 [hereinafter "History of Utah's Constitution].
One article offering an "analysis of the unique context in
which Utah's constitution developed" is Martha Bradley's "Hide and
Seek":

Children on the Underground. 51 Utah Hist. Q. 133 (1983)

(hereinafter "Hide and Seek").

See id. cited in State v. Bobo, 803

P.2d 1268, 1272-73 n.5 (Utah App. 1990).

Part of Utah's

constitutional development was the fact that "hundreds of men went
into hiding to avoid prosecution [for polygamy and established] a
policy of 'passive resistance.'"

Hide and Seek at 137.

Bradley's article continued, noting the community's
prevalent concern with inadvertant and involuntary disclosures:
Many mothers and children also went into hiding to
avoid being called into court to testify against their
husbands and fathers.
. . .

The practice of sending women to prison for
refusing to testify against their husbands had
tremendous implications for their children who would
then most likely be left without either parent. . . .
In 1885 one plural wife, Mrs. Harris, received a
contempt citation for refusing to answer questions
before a grand jury about the nature of her
relationship with her polygamous husband. As a
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result, she spent three months in the overcrowded Utah
penitentiary with her baby.

Mormon communities, which had always been marked by a
high degree of cooperation, became tightly knit
enclaves in which strangers were suspiciously avoided.

If strangers probed into private family living
arrangements or situations, they were suspected of
being involved in the crusade. Children were
carefully taught to avoid being questioned, but when
cornered they were told to create confusion, to
misinform, and then to hide themselves.

The constant pressure of performing successfully, of
avoiding trouble themselves, and of worrying about
their fathers7 and neighbors' safety weighed heavily
on the young and was a constant and dreary presence in
their lives.
Hide and Seek at 137, 138, 141, 146-48.
The authors of Utah's constitution, all of whom were
familiar with the "atmosphere" then in existence, would have
welcomed the greater protections of a Bram-like rule.
Wallentine, Heeding the Call:

Cf.

Search and Seizure Jurisprudence

Under the Utah Constitution. Article I. Section 14, 17 Utah J.
Contemp. L. 267 (1991) (at the time of the 1897 Bram decision,
Utah's constitutional drafters included men who had practiced
polygamy).

Indeed, during the drafting of Utah's Constitution, the

state legislators were ever so mindful of the persecution just
endured by their people.

"The majority of present state

constitutions were drafted in . . . an era of popular mistrust and
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hostility toward government.

The people's mistrust of government is

readily apparent on the face of many state constitutions.

Utah's

constitution, drafted in 1895, is representative of the era. . ."
Flynn, History of Utah's Constitution at 314.
A totality of the circumstances test would have conflicted
with the mindset of Utah's constitutional delegates.

Despite their

recent renunciation of polygamy in exchange for statehood,
sympathetic Utah legislators would not have tolerated
polygamy-related confessions induced under a "totality" standard.
If, for example, still lurking federal marshalls elicited a
confession from Mrs. Harris (the plural wife mentioned in
Ms. Bradley's article, see Hide and Seek at 141 n.13 and
accompanying text), Utah's constitutional inquiry would have focused
only on whether the marshals used "threats or promises, however
slight," to induce the confession.

Utah's legislators would not

have wanted Mrs. Harris' prior familiarity with the justice system
to factor into a voluntariness determination, nor should her age or
intelligence have offset a finding of coercion.
Regardless of how this issue was resolved under the federal
constitution, Utah's constitution required the trial court to grant
Mr. Miller's motion to suppress.

A historical and textual state

constitutional analysis provide appropriate justifications for
returning to a "Brain-like" standard.
Alternatively, a "sister state" analysis finds support in
other jurisdictions.

For example, in State v. Capwell, 669 P.2d 808
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(Or. App. 1983), the Court held, "Article 1, section 12 prohibits
the use of a confession which has been induced by a direct or
implied promise."

Capwell, 669 P.2d at 810.1

Though unstated in

Capwell, its state constitutional prohibition against induced
confessions finds some of its roots in Bram v. United States, 168
U.S. 532 (1897).

See State v. Mendacino. 603 P.2d 1376, 1381 n.6

(Or. 1979) (citing Bram, 168 U.S. 532). The thrust of Bram was
summarized in the decision of Malloy v. Hocran, 378 U.S. 1 (1964):
[I]n Bram, the Court held that "[i]n criminal trials,
in the courts of the United States, wherever a
question arises whether a confession is incompetent
because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that
portion of the Fifth Amendment . . . commanding that

1

A more moderate approach was taken by the court in
People v. Conte, 365 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Mich. 1984). At issue there
was whether the Michigan Constitution prohibited promises of
leniency through the strict "Bram" rule or the "totality of the
circumstances" test. Finding neither standard appropriate, the
court rejected them both in favor of "the simple rule that a
confession caused by a promise of leniency is involuntary and
inadmissible. There must be a promise and that promise must cause
the confession." 365 N.W.2d at 657. The analysis used there is
particularly insightful, particularly its criticism of the "totality
of the circumstance" test.
The Utah Supreme Court seemed to cite Conte with approval,
see State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 227 (Utah 1989), although it was
in dicta and no definitive position was taken. Other jurisdictions,
while not relying specifically on Conte, have also used language
comparable to the "Conte principle" in interpreting their own state
constitution. See State v. McDermott, 554 A.2d 1302, 1305 (N.H.
1989) ("A confession made in reliance upon a promise of
confidentiality or a promise of immunity is involuntary and coerced
under [New Hampshire's] Constitution"). Notwithstanding these
decisions, Petitioner Miller reiterates how the historical
uniqueness of Utah justifies an even broader test than those used
under other state constitutions. In the alternative, however,
Appellant Miller would not oppose a "Conte-like" standard for
purposes of a state constitutional analysis.
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no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.'" Under this test,
the constitutional inquiry is not whether the
conduct of state officers in obtaining the
confession was shocking, but whether the confession
was "free and voluntary: that is, [it] must not be
extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor
obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight, nor by the exertion of any improper
influence. In other words, the person must not have
been compelled to incriminate himself. We have held
inadmissible even a confession secured by so mild a
whip as the refusal, under certain circumstances, to
allow a suspect to call his wife until he confessed.
Malloy. 378 U.S. at 7 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
Utah's Constitution should also recognize principles akin
to those announced by Bram.

Compare Note, The Compelled Confession;

A Case Against Admissibility. 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 800 (1985)
(especially Part II's critique of the "totality of the
circumstances" test and Part Ill's proposed standard using the Bram
principles).

Even though federal cases have not always adhered to

the "rigid Bram rule,"2 a recent string of state cases have not only
recognized the right to depart from federal precedent, a different
analysis has actually been employed.

See, e.g.. State v. Larocco,

794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (more protective state constitutional
interpretation of the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement); State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991) (absent

2

But see Gunsby v. Wainwright. 596 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.
1979) cert, denied. 444 U.S. 946 (1979); McLallen v. Wvrick. 498
F.Supp. 137 (W.D. Mo. 1980); People v. Jones. 331 N.W.2d 406 (1982)
cert, denied. 460 U.S. 1084 (1983) (Kavanagh, J.); Ashby v. State.
354 N.E.2d 192 (1976); Fex v. State. 386 So.2d 58 (Fla. App. 1980).
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legislative authority, article I, section 14 prohibits suspicionless
investigative roadblocks).
In contrast to the unambiguous nature of the proposed state
standard, the weighing or balancing process inherent in the federal
"totality" standard provides insufficient guidance for courts and
officers alike:
While we do not think our constitution necessarily
must be interpreted as granting exactly the same
protection as the federal constitution, we also do
not believe the balancing test approach is mandated
by the Utah Constitution, nor are we convinced it
would provide the salutary effects anticipated.
Rather, it appears likely to lead to uncertainty on
the part of prosecutors and defendants, . . . . We
are troubled also by the transitory nature of the
protection offered the individual under this
balancing test approach: it exists only when the
interest of the state is perceived as weak,
disappearing when the state's interest is perceived
as great.
State v. Franklin. 735 P.2d 34, 38 (Utah 1987).

The Franklin

opinion expressed these remarks in a context different from the case
at bar, but the Court's rationale remains applicable here.

Just as

defendant Franklin could not use the "transitory nature" of the
balancing test to his advantage, neither should state prosecutors
use the weighing process to overcome otherwise insurmountable
deficiencies in the "totality" of the proof.

See id.; see infra

Point II.C; cf. State v. Holland. 777 P.2d 1019, 1028 (Utah 1989)
(where the court acknowledged that factors given "weight" or
persuasiveness vary "with each judge or juror according to his or
her own background and prior experiences").
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The subjective "leeway" afforded the federal "totality"
standard results in inconsistent decisions, particularly in a case
like Mr. Miller's where the trial court had already determined that
some of the circumstances were coercive.

Despite its preliminary

conclusion, the trial court then simply discounted the circumstances
and gave more weight to Miller's intellect and background.

A

historical and "sister state" analysis supports a clearer and fairer,
state constitutional standard for determining the voluntariness of a
confession.
REASONS JUSTIFYING THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
The court of appeals' decision in Miller created a
conflict in opinions as to the proper analysis for determining the
coerciveness of a confession.

Petitioner requests this Court to

determine whether (or to what extent) the accused's characteristics
should factor into the coercive determination.
Petitioner also seeks clarification from this Court in
regards to whether citing a case which is developed on appeal
sufficiently preserves a state constitutional issue, and whether a
different, state constitutional standard should be adopted.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Miller respectfully requests that this Court grant
his petition for writ of certiorari on the questions presented
herein.
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APPENDIX 1

Kuie 4b. Considerations governing r e v i e w of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter ofright,but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departedfromthe accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by the Supreme Court.

Rule 48. Time for petitioning.
(a) Timeliness of petition. A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the
decision by the Court of Appeals.
(b) Refusal of petition. The clerk will refuse to receive any petition for a
writ of certiorari which is jurisdictionally out of time.
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for filing a petition for a
writ of certiorari runs from the date the decision is entered by the Court of
Appeals, not from the date of the issuance of the remittitur. If, however, a
petition for rehearing is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the
petition for a writ of certiorari for all parties runsfromthe date of the denial
of rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the rehearing.

Rule 49. Petition for writ of certiorari.
(a) Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order
indicated:
( D A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in the Supreme Court contains the names of all parties.
# (2) A table of contents with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, agency rules, court rales, statutes, and authorities
cited, with references to the pages of the petition where they are cited.
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement
of the questions should be short and concise and should not be argumentative or repetitious. General conclusions, such as "the decision of the Court
of Appeals is not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable. The
statement of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only the questions set forth in
the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme
Court.
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions
issued by the Court of Appeals.
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is invoked, showing:
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed;
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and
the date of the entry and terms of any order granting an extension of
time within which to petition for certiorari;
(C) reliance upon Rule 47(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of
certiorari is filed, stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of
certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition isfiled-anA
rr\\

*t--
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76-6-202

BURGLARY

(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters
or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion
of a building with intent to commit a felony or
theft or commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which
event it is a felony of the second degree.

76-6-404

THEFT-ELEMENTS

A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive him thereof.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessaiy to cany into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originate
ing with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry,
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer,
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) afinaljudgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appealsfromany court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony,
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
0*) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony,
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)Cb).
rr~—

Utah Const. Art. 1, section 12 reads:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the county or district in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed, and the right
to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife nor shall
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.

Article I, § 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec* 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance
of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched and
the person or thing to be seized*

U.S. Const, Amend V reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.

APPENDIX 2

cumstances. In this case, the court erroneously
interpreted the statute, and, as a result, failed
to conduct an evidentiary hearing.3 We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing
plaintiffs complaint.
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding
Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
1. Plaintiff also seeks review of the trial court's
order requiring her to disclose her telephone number
to defendant. We decline to address that issue on
the basis of mootness.
2. In In re Marriage of Blitstcin, 212 111. App. 3d
124, 569 N.E.2d 1357 (1991), the court held that
abuse can occur even if there is no overt act of
violence. Id. at 1361. The court stated that abuse,
which is defined in the Illinois Domestic Violence
Act to include harassment, can include intentional
acts that would cause another to be worried,
anxious, or uncomfortable. Id.; see also Johnson v.
Miller, 157 Wis. 2d 482, 459 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Ct.
App. 1990)(stepfather,s history of violence against
stepdaughter coupled with his forcible entry into a
residence occupied by stepdaughter provides adequate foundation for restraining order).
3. The trial judge inferred that he was not denying
plaintiff a remedy because her remedy was to file
for divorce and obtain a restraining order. However,
the Act specifically expands the civil and criminal
remedies for victims of domestic violence. See Utah
Code Ann. §30-6-7 (1989)(,rAll proceedings
pursuant to this act are separate and independent of
any proceedings for divorce, annulment, or separate
maintenance and the remedies provided are in addition to any other available civil or criminal remedies."). In addition, restraining orders are often
ineffective in protecting abused spouses. See Jane A.
Marquardt and Cathie Cox, Violence Against
Wives: Expected Effects of Utah's Spouse
Act, 5 J. Contemp. L. 277,287-88 (1979).
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Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
GARFF, Judge:
Mikel Shane Miller appeals his conviction of
third degree burglary and third degree theft,
claiming the trial judge improperly admitted
into evidence a coerced and involuntary confession. We affirm.
FACTS
Miller was booked into the Salt Lake
County Jail on July 2 or 3, 1990, following a
parole violation unrelated to the charges invplved in this appeal. On July 6, 1990, a detective interrogated Miller about his possible
involvement in a burglary and theft of a
computer store.
Prior to the interrogation, the detective
informed Miller of the potential charges facing
him and read Miller his Miranda rights. The
detective promised Miller that he would make
the best recommendation possible to the prosecutor and would attempt to "get [the
charges] filed as low as he possibly could" if
Miller cooperated. The detective also informed
Miller that he potentially faced federal charges
and resulting penalties. Miller then confessed
to the crimes and was released from jail into
the custody of the detective in order to help
recover the stolen goods.
Miller cooperated extensively with the detective in recovering the stolen goods. He also
cooperated with other officers in a later, successful sting operation. Felony charges were,
however, eventually filed against Miller.
At trial, the State sought admission of the
confession. Miller objected, claiming the detective had not met his part of the bargain in
getting the charges reduced to misdemeanors.
Miller argued that promises of leniency and
threats of federal charges coercively induced
his confession.
The court applied a "totality of circumstances" test in deciding whether to admit the
testimony. It found the length of time Miller
had spent in jail prior to the interrogation and
the threats of possible federal charges were
"impermissibly coercive." However, the court,
noting Miller's familiarity with the justice
system and various interrogation techniques,
also found him to be intelligent, well-spoken
and articulate. Thus, based on the totality of
the circumstances, the court declared Miller's
confession voluntary anH HM;*H U;«. ~—»:— —

Following a bench trial. Miller was convited of two third degree felonies, burglary and
icft. The trial judge commented that without
teller's confession, he could not have found
/filler guilty on the theft charge.
Miller appeals, claiming the confession was
mproperly admitted into evidence because it
/as obtained through promises of leniency
md threats of federal prosecution in a coerive environment. Miller also claims that the
Tifth Amendment of the Utah Constitution
>rovides broader protection against self incrmination than does the totality of the circunstances test of the federal constitution.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The "ultimate issue of 'voluntariness' [of a
:onfession] is a legal question/ Arizona v.
Fulminante, _ U . S
, 111 S. Ct 1246, 1252
(1991) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S.
104, 110, 106 S. Ct. 445, 449-50 (1985)); accord,
State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1309
(Utah App. 1991), which we review independently giving no deference to the trial court.
Srare v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah
1991). "It is the duty of an appellate court ...
'to examine the entire record and make an
independent determination of the ultimate
issue of voluntariness.'" Srare v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 464 n.76 (Utah 1988) (quoting
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348,
96S.Ct. 1612, 1617(1976)).
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
Miller claims promises of leniency and
threats of federal prosecution in a coercive
environment induced his involuntary confession.
Miller's claim is based largely on the trial
court's determination that the threat of
federal charges, the promises of leniency and
the length of his stay in jail prior to the interrogation were evidence of "impermissible"
coercion.1 Certainly, there are cases which
support such a conclusion. Threats of possibly
greater charges were found to be coercive in
State v. Rhiner, 352 N.W.2d 258, 262-64
(Iowa 1984) (defendant coercively told "he
might be in jeopardy on other charges unless
he cooperated"). Promises of leniency have
also been found to be a coercive factor. United
States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335
(9th Cir. 1981) ("promise to seek lenient treatment" is evidence of coercion). Moreover,
confinement in jail provides a suspect setting
for coercive interrogations. State v. Moore,
697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985).
However, in State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court declined
to follow a strict per se rule and designated
the totality of circumstances test as appropriate for determining the voluntariness of a
confession.2 Id. at 227. The court stated,

statement was made that any threat or
promise, however slight, renders a confession
involuntary and inadmissible, later cases do
not repeat that rigid rule but follow the totality of all the circumstances test." Strain, 779
P.2d at 227. The court then remanded Strain
to the trial court to determine the voluntariness of the confession by considering the
"totality of all the surrounding circumstances." Id. Therefore, we continue our analysis
to determine whether from the totality of the
circumstances "the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation"
support the trial court's conclusion that the
confession was voluntary. Id. at 225 (quoting
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, All U.S. 218,
226, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047 (1973)).
The record reveals that defendant is an
intelligent individual with some college education. The trial court noted that Miller "has a
mind that can make sudden and important
distinctions in language." He is also very
familiar with the legal system. He has been to
prison twice, jailed four times, and has had
some fifteen encounters with police. Miller's
own recollection of the interrogation demonstrates he was familiar with interrogation techniques and that he actively and intelligently
participated in the interrogation:
I told [the detective] I was aware
where I am at that time frame with
the system, unfortunately, and that
I've seen the you scratch my back,
I'll scratch yours type of play
before, and I don't want to put my
neck on the line and go through all
this for nothing, to incriminate
myself.... [I]f there is any way
possible that I can work my way
out of a felony, I would be more
than willing to do that.
In short,' the record reveals Miller actively
participated in the interrogation process, and
may have actually initiated and solicited the
promise to recommend more lenient treatment,
and that he was fully aware of the possible
effect of a confession. In addition, the detective did not unqualifiedly promise Miller he
would not be charged with a felony, but only
that he would use his best efforts to have the
charge reduced.
The trial judge thus correctly refused to
suppress Miller's confession under the totality
of the circumstances test because "the characteristics of the accused" outweigh any potentially coercive "details of the interrogation."
Id.
Miller
provides
ission of
federallv

STATE CONSTITUTION
argues that the Utah Constitution
broader protection against the adminvoluntary confessions than does the
adopted "totality of the circumsta-
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was not presented to the trial court at the constitutional protections might be broader than
suppression hearing, and thereby has not been federal protections.
properly preserved for appeal. Srare v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990), Also,
Miller has failed to present any exceptional
Cite as
circumstances or demonstrate plain error,
183
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either of which would warrant an exception to
this rule. See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 78
IN THE
(UtahApp. 1990).
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Rather, Miller argues that this issue was
properly preserved for appeal on the ground
that he cited the case of Srare v. Crank, 105 STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943) in his Memorv.
andum Supporting Defendant's Motion to
3
Jorge
FIGUEROA-SOLORIO,
Suppress. However, the argument that Crank
Defendant and Appellant.
may be read to provide broader protections in
suppression hearings was not argued before
the trial court, nor brought to the court's No. 910170-CA
attention for consideration. We refuse to FILED: March 25, 1992
adopt such a broad rule that would preserve
an issue for appeal by merely citing to a case Third District, Salt Lake County
without accompanying argument. Barring Honorable Pat B. Brian
exceptional circumstances or plain error, a ATTORNEYS:
party must bring an issue to the attention of Richard G. Uday, Salt Lake City, for
the trial court to properly preserve it for
Appellant
appeal.
R. Paul Van Dam and David B. Thompson,
CONCLUSION
Salt Lake City, for Appellee
In light of the totality of the circumstances, Before Judges Billings, Onne, and Russon.
the trial court did not err in concluding that
the confession was voluntary. Therefore, the
AMENDED OPINION*
trial court did not err in refusing to suppress
Miller's confession.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
Affirmed.
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
RUSSON, Judge:
WE CONCUR:
Defendant Jorge Figueroa-Solorio appeals
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
his conviction of possession of a controlled
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
substance, a third degree felony, in violation
of U t a h Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
1. The trial judge stated:
(1990).
There is no doubt in my mind there was
some indication of leniency given to the
defendant here
1 think that what the officer told Mr.
Miller in jail was ... 'listen, 1 am dose
to the prosecutor. He generall> will
accept my recommendations. If you can
help us we will see what you can
produce and I will do the best 1 can to
get him to file misdemeanor charges.*
1 assume [the officer] also told
[Miller] he was facing federal charges
and that that was in some way a coercion.... 1 find that he had been in jail
three or four days, which is a substantial
time, and that indicates to some extent
there is some coercion.
2. The United States Supreme Court likewise recently declined to follow a strict per se rule in Arizona
\. Fulminantc, _ U . S
111 S. Q . 1246, 1252
(1991).
3. In Crank, the Utah Supreme Court relied on

FACTS
On January 1, 1991, Salt Lake City Police
Officers B.L. Smith and Louis Jones observed
defendant cross State Street at approximately
916 South in Salt Lake City. There is no crosswalk or traffic light at that location. Accordingly, the officers decided to issue a jaywalking citation to defendant, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §41-6-79 (1988) of the Motor
Vehicle Act.
Officers Smith and Jones approached defendant, who had gotten into a parked car.
They asked defendant to get out of the car
and then asked for identification. The defendant said that he did not have any I.D., but
wrote his name in Officer Smith's notebook
*hen requested to do so. Officer Smith went
to his patrol car to check his warrants book
for any outstanding warrants for defendant's
arrest. Having found an outstanding warrant
r~_

*i*c

_i~_*i,. _MA4.«. t ; r t . ^
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As the majority holds, this case must be
remanded for additional findings. The majority's statements concerning how we
should review those findings are therefore
dicta. Since the standard of review is not
an issue in this case, it need not be mentioned at all. If any discussion is necessary, I would not depart from the longstanding practice of Utah courts to treat
the voluntariness of a consent to search as
a question of fact reviewable under the
clearly-erroneous standard.
See, e.g.f
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah
1990); State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122, 12627 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1991); State v. Grower, 808 P.2d 133, 137 (Utah Ct.App.1991);
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah CtApp.
1990).
Because I do not agree with dicta in the
main opinion concerning the standard of
review, I concur only in the result.
(O
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Defendant was convicted of manslaughter, in the Third District Court, Summit County, Michael R. Murphy, J., and
defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) evidence of
defendant's recklessness was sufficient to
support manslaughter conviction; (2) conversation among federal agents regarding
their families did not overcome defendant's
free will, and therefore his subsequent
statements were not the product of coercive tactics and were voluntarily made; and
(3) conversation among agents was not in

1UI/U

violation of defendant's decision to remain
silent, but rather defendant voluntarily
abandoned his privilege against self-incrimination under circumstances not amounting
to interrogation.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law <3=>1159.2(3)
On appeal challenging sufficiency of
evidence, Court of Appeals does not find
facts anew even if defendant presents
some competent contradictory evidence;
Court's scope is strictly limited to determining whether there was evidence to reasonably support each element of charged offense.
2. Homicide ®=>269
When
considering
manslaughter
charge, degree of defendant's perception of
risk presents conjecture-laden inquiry, involving both subjective and objective elements. U.C.A.1953, 76-5-205(1).
3. Homicide <3=>255(1)
In resolving question of defendant's
subjective intent in manslaughter trial, jury
is not limited to consideration of defendant's testimony, but rather it is within
province of properly instructed jury to consider all evidence admitted at trial and then
decide whether defendant acted recklessly.
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-205(1).
4. Homicide ®»255(1)
Evidence of defendant's recklessness
was sufficient to support manslaughter
conviction for death of police officer, even
though defendant claimed that he was not
aware of risk to human life when he fired
rifle at police service dogs; shots struck at
building at a potentially lethal height for
humans, defendant's second group of shots
were evenly spaced with sufficient time
between them to allow for reacquisition of
target, and shots toward building could
have easily reached another occupied
house. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-103(3), 76-5205(1).
5. Criminal Law <s=>1169.1(l)
If, after excising challenged evidence,
Court of Appeals remains convinced that
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conviction would have followed, Court finds
lower court's ruling that evidence was admissible to be harmless error.
6. Criminal Law <^>525
Adult defendant's claims that he was
mildly retarded and functioned at juvenile
level did not have to be addressed in determining voluntariness of defendant's confession.
7. Criminal Law <3=>412.1(1)
Defendant's free will was not overcome by law enforcement agents as they
conversed regarding their families, and
therefore defendant's subsequent statements were not the product of coercive
tactics and were voluntarily made, even
though defendant claimed to have been suffering from "clinical depression," and alleged that agents used subtle form of coercion to which he was particularly vulnerable.
8. Criminal Law <s=>412.1(4)
Federal agents' conversation during
which they "pined" for their own homes
and families did not constitute functional
equivalent of interrogation, and therefore
did not violate defendant's prior decision to
remain silent, but rather defendant voluntarily abandoned his privilege against selfincrimination under circumstances not
amounting to interrogation, even though
bombing and siege in which defendant had
been involved resulted from difficulties experienced by his own family. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 5.

ond degree felony. Singer claims the evidence was adequate to support a conviction
of negligent homicide, yet insufficient to
support a conviction for the more serious
offense of manslaughter. Singer also alleges that certain statements made by him
were obtained in violation of his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. We reject both arguments and affirm.
FACTS
Before dawn on January 16, 1988, a loud
explosion and accompanying tremors of unknown origin occurred in Marion, Utah, in
rural Summit County. Later that morning,
the custodian for a local church discovered
that the church building had been damaged. A police detective investigated and
found a carved staff, near the sight of
what proved to be a bomb blast. The staff
was painted red, adorned with feathers,
and engraved with the motto, "J.S.—JAN.
18
1979—CHURCH—STATE—NATION
WILL BE DESTROYED."

The initials "J.S." represented "John
Singer," father of the defendant and selfstyled prophet, who was killed at his ranch
in Marion during an arrest attempt on January 18, 1979, the date carved into the
staff. The family, now guided by John
Singer's widow, Vicki Singer, and son-inlaw, Addam Swapp, still resided at the Marion ranch. Addam Swapp later admitted to
bombing the church. State v. Swapp, 808
P.2d 115, 116 n. 1 (Utah App.1991). Family
members believed that destruction of the
G. Fred Metos (argued), Yengich, Rich, church house would precipitate the resurXaiz & Metos, Salt Lake City, for appel- rection of John Singer. After the bombing,
lant.
Addam Swapp declared the Singer ranch to
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., C. Horton, be an independent nation, and the heavilyII, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Salt Lake armed family barricaded itself in the main
City, for appellee.
residence of the ranch. Addam Swapp and
Vicki Singer were indicted by a federal
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and ORME, grand jury for their part in the bombing
JJ.
and warrants were issued for their arrest
and for search of the Singer ranch. A
OPINION
thirteen-day siege by state and federal law
enforcement officials followed.
ORME, Judge:
Defendant John Timothy Singer appeals
from a conviction for manslaughter, a sec-

During the siege, Addam Swapp, his
brother Jonathan, and the defendant fre-
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quently ventured outside the home as they
attended to farm chores, such as milking
the family goat, and monitored the movements and positions of law enforcement
officers. Each, including the wheelchairbound defendant,1 was heavily armed during these brief forays. Due to the presence of a number of children in the Singer
home, law enforcement officials hoped to
persuade the Singers to terminate the siege
and surrender without violence. Lights
and loudspeakers were utilized in an attempt to confuse and tire the Singers. The
Singers responded by disabling the equipment, even leaving the confines of the
ranch to do so. The officials' attitude of
restraint ultimately led to deployment of
police service dogs and their handlers in
execution of a plan calculated to arrest
Addam Swapp without gunfire.2
Under the cover of darkness, agents of
the Utah State Corrections Police Service
Dog Team and the Federal Bureau of Investigation Hostage Rescue Team took position in a nearby structure, known as the
Bates house, bordering the west side of the
Singer ranch. The Swapp brothers had
earlier been seen in the Bates house. Officials hoped that agents would be able to
isolate and peaceably arrest the Swapps if
they made a repeat visit to the Bates
house. Later the plan was modified to
direct the police service dogs to take the
Swapp brothers to the ground as they left
the Singer house to milk the goat. On
January 28, 1988, Corrections Lieutenant
Fred House and Officer Jerry Pope positioned themselves with their dogs at the
front door of the Bates house in order to
release and command their dogs. Lieutenant House was crouched in the doorway,
his right side slightly exposed to the Singer
house. Other agents stood nearby to provide support for the dog handlers.
As the Swapp brothers approached the
goat pen, the dogs were released. A nearly simultaneous series of events ensued. A
burst of shots was fired from the Singer
l.

Defendant was paralyzed four years earlier in
a tree-felline
tree-felling accident.

2. Officials believed that Addam Swapp was the
family's leader and that his capture would lead

house. The dogs became confused and
failed to key on the brothers. Addam
Swapp shouldered his weapon and took aim
at the officers. Officers fired at Addam
Swapp and he was wounded with a single
gunshot to the wrist. He quickly retreated
into the Singer house. Lieutenant House
was struck and felled by gunshots. The
dogs reentered the Bates house through
the front door and a second series of shots
rang out from the Singer house. Agents
pulled Lieutenant House further into the
Bates house and attempted first aid. Lieutenant House did not respond and was pronounced dead on arrival following evacuation by helicopter to the University of Utah
Medical Center.
Immediately after the shooting stopped,
Addam Swapp walked out of the Singer
house to surrender, although family members called to him to return. With the
surrender of Addam Swapp, the remainder
of the family quickly followed suit. Singer
was taken into custody by agents of the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
and transported to detention facilities in
Salt Lake City.
A search of the Singer house revealed
twenty-three firearms and over 8,000
rounds of ammunition cached at various
points around the house. Two .30 caliber
rifles were located near the window of Timothy Singer's bedroom. One of these rifles
was later identified as the weapon from
which the shots directed at the Bates house
were fired, including the fatal shot to Lieutenant House.
Subsequent to his arrest and administration of Miranda warnings, Singer waived
his constitutional rights to counsel and to
remain silent, began to talk, changed his
mind and invoked his right to remain silent,
and then talked again. Singer was interviewed and gave a statement admitting he
was seated in his wheelchair at his bedroom window when the Swapp brothers
went out to milk the goat. Singer admitted
to a prompt capitulation by other family members. Ultimately, this belief proved to be accurate.
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to firing his rifle in the direction of the
dogs and the Bates house, but denied firing
at any officers, although he admitted he
knew handlers would not be far from the
dogs. Singer was charged with second degree murder. He was tried by a jury,
which was instructed on second degree
murder, as well as on the lesser offenses of
manslaughter and negligent homicide. The
jury convicted Singer of manslaughter and
he was sentenced to a term of one-to-fifteen years in the state prison, to run consecutively to his federal sentences.3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a difficult task.
When reviewing whether evidence is sufficient to support a jury conviction,
we review the evidence and all inferences
which may be reasonably drawn from it
in the light most favorable to the verdict
of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah
1983). Even if the defendant presents
some competent contradictory evidence, we
do not find facts anew. See State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1989). Our
scope is strictly limited to determining
whether there was evidence to reasonably
support each element of the charged offense, and we must "assume that the jury
3. Defendant was convicted of the federal crimes
of attempted second degree murder, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1114 (1988), resisting or assaulting a federal
officer, 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1988), and two counts
of using a firearm during a crime of violence,
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988). These charges
also arose out of the 13-day encounter with law
enforcement officers. Defendant was sentenced
to 10 years in federal prison for these crimes.
4. "Recklessness" is defined as:
A person engages in conduct ... [rjecklessly,
or maliciously, with respect to the circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result
of his conduct when he is aware but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifi-

believed those portions of the evidence supporting the verdict." State v. Stewart, 729
P.2d 610, 611 (Utah 1986).
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Singer asks this court to reverse his conviction for manslaughter, admitting, however, that the evidence would support a
conviction for negligent homicide. Under a
charge of manslaughter, the prosecution
must prove one of three alternative theories of culpability. The manslaughter statute provides:
Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; or
(b) causes the death of another under
the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse; or
(c) causes the death of another under
circumstances where the actor reasonably believes the circumstances provide a
legal justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct is not legally
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1) (1990).4
Singer claims the evidence was insufficient
to establish that he acted recklessly in
causing the death of Lieutenant Fred
House. He claims he was merely negligent
and thus should only have been convicted
of negligent homicide: "Criminal homicide
constitutes negligent homicide if the actor,
acting with criminal negligence, causes
the death of another." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-206(1) (1990) (emphasis added).5
able risk that the circumstances exist or will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (1990).
5. "Criminal negligence" is defined as
A person engages in conduct ... [w]ith criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the
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Thus, the sufficiency of the evidence proving the mental state required for manslaughter, as opposed to negligent homicide, forms the nucleus of Singer's challenge.
In State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142 (Utah
1983), the defendant and his brother, both
of whom were intoxicated, argued and
fought over car keys. Dyer produced a
rifle which discharged in the direction of
his brother. The bullet missed his brother,
but traveled through the wall and struck
and killed a friend standing outside the
room. Evidence established that, although
the gun had been modified by a gunsmith,
the gun could not be fired without pulling
the trigger. Dyer was tried for manslaughter, but convicted of the lesser offense of negligent homicide. Dyer claimed
the evidence was insufficient to show that
he acted with criminal negligence. Reviewing the evidence introduced at trial, the
Utah Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed Dyer's conviction. The Court stated:
The only difference between reckless
and criminally negligent conduct is that
under the former, one perceives a risk
and consciously disregards it, whereas
under the latter, one fails to even perceive the risk. The risk in both cases
must be of such a degree that an ordinary person would not disregard or fail
to recognize it. The distinction, then, is
merely one of the degree of perception of.
the risk.
Dyer, 671 P.2d at 148. Thus, the critical
distinction to be reached between recklessness and criminal negligence is the measure of perception of the risk leading to the
victim's death.
The distinction is not capable of precise
definition.
The difference between [criminal] negligence and recklessness is not marked by
a sharp analytical line. On the contrary,
the difference generally lies in making a
judgment as to where on a continuum of
result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive
it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would

unreasonable conduct one's behavior
passes from negligence to recklessness.
In essence it is a matter of judging when
conduct is no longer just gray but dark
gray.
Boggess v. State, 655 P.2d 654, 658 (Utah
1982).
[2,3] When considering a manslaughter
charge, the degree of defendant's perception of the risk presents a conjecture-laden
inquiry, involving both objective and subjective elements. State v. Wessendorf, 777
P.2d 523, 525-26 (Utah App.), cert denied,
781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989). The jury must
not only determine the defendant's subjective intent, but must also decide whether
an ordinary person who was aware of the
risk would act in spite of the risk. Id. A
defendant can fairly be expected to testify
that he or she was possessed of the most
innocuous subjective intent when he or she
committed the unlawful act. However, in
resolving the question of defendant's subjective intent, the jury is not limited to
consideration of the defendant's testimony.
It is within the province of a properly instructed jury to consider all evidence admitted at trial and then decide whether the
defendant acted recklessly. See State v.
Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 454 (Utah 1986) ("it
remains within the prerogative of the jury
to make the determination whether the defendant lacked the intent"); State v. Howard, 597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979) (distinction between requisite intent for manslaughter and negligent homicide is "a
question of fact to be decided by the jury").
[4] Singer claims the evidence does not
establish that he was aware of a risk to
human life when he fired the rifle at the
police service dogs. He claims he had no
reason to know of the officers' presence in
the Bates house. Singer argues that the
officers directing the police dogs entered
the Bates home under the cover of darkness and through a window not directly
visible from the Singer home. He also
points out that the Swapp brothers had
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's standpoint.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (1990).
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entered the Bates home earlier and found
the home unoccupied during those visits.
Singer asserts he was only shooting at
the police service dogs running about the
property, in the belief that they posed a
threat to the Swapp brothers. The State
countered this claim with evidence that
Singer's second volley resulted in a tight
pattern of shots centered on the door
frame. This group of shots was fired
while the dogs were still wandering in the
open field between the Singer and Bates
homes. All four shots struck at a potentially lethal height.6 Perhaps even more
significant was the timing of the shots,
demonstrated in a videotape of the encounter shown to the jury. The first three
shots were fired in rapid sequence, and
were answered by officers' gunfire as Addam Swapp simultaneously prepared to fire
upon the officers. The second group of
shots followed in measured beats, evenly
spaced with sufficient time between them
to allow for reacquisition of the target.
The jury could have reasonably inferred a
measure of deliberation of aim from this
evidence, and equally discredited Singer's
claim that he was only aiming at the dogs.
The nature of Singer's purported targets
themselves, police service dogs, refutes his
claim of "only" shooting at dogs. These
dogs were not of the wandering neighborhood variety—they were obviously police
service dogs who could not reasonably be
believed to be casually roaming independent of a human handler. Singer saw the
open door at the Bates house and admitted
the dogs must have come from the house.
Singer stated that he believed the shots
which preceded his came from the Bates
house, and conceded that the door through
which the dogs were released must have
been opened and closed by a person in the
Bates house.7
6. Singer argues that the level of the shots was
affected by an errant gunsight and if Singer's
rifle sight had been properly adjusted for the
distance between the Bates home and his firing
point, the level of the shots would have more
nearly approximated the height of the dogs'
heads, Singer's claimed targets. Testimony of
this sort is highly speculative, and the jury could
have reasonably rejected it. An equally speculative, yet equally plausible, explanation for the
height of the shots is that, correctly supposing

The State introduced additional evidence
supporting a conclusion that Singer acted
recklessly, even if the jury stopped short of
concluding that Singer was subjectively
aware of the officers in the Bates house.
Diagrams and photographs of the Singer
ranch and surrounding properties were
presented at trial to illustrate the sequence
of events during the siege. Near the Bates
property, separated by a small open patch,
were several other homes. The Jepsen
home bordered the Bates house on the west
side, with the Singer property on the east.
During the course of the thirteen-day
standoff, and after evacuation of area residents, officers used the Jepsen house and
were clearly visible as they moved about
the Jepsen property. The State offered
testimony that members of the Singer clan
had observed law enforcement officers
moving about the Jepsen property during
the siege. The proximity of the Bates and
Jepsen homes is such that any shots fired
at or in the direction of the Bates home,
but missing their target—including shots
fired at wandering animals—would likely
strike the Jepsen home. Only shots fired
at an extreme angle to the rear of the
Bates property would not traverse the
plane of the Jepsen property. The jury
could have reasonably concluded that shots
fired even generally towards the Bates
house were fired recklessly since they
could easily reach the occupied Jepsen
property.
We confine our review of the evidence to
determining whether the evidence was
"sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt" that defendant acted recklessly in shooting his rifle
and causing the death of Lieutenant
House. Petree, 659 P.2d at 444. Assuming the jury believed the evidence suggestthe officers to be equipped with bullet-resistant
vests, Singer aimed into the doorway at a height
approximating the unprotected groin area.
7. Singer argues that any statements regarding
his awareness of the presence of officers in the
Bates house were taken in violation of his right
to silence. We treat this claim in the following
section.
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ing Singer's awareness of persons within
his line of fire, as we must, Stewart, 729
P.2d at 611, we do not find that the evidence of recklessness was "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt" that Singer acted recklessly. Petree, 659 P.2d at 444. Questions
of intent are strictly within the province of
the jury and the jury was not required to
accept that Singer was merely plinking at
the police service dogs unaware of any risk
to human life. Velarde, 734 P.2d at 454;
Howard, 597 P.2d at 881. Accordingly, we
hold the evidence of Singer's recklessness
to be sufficient to support a conviction of
manslaughter for the death of Lieutenant
Fred House.
SUPPRESSION OF CONFESSION
[5] Singer claims the trial court erred in
refusing to suppress certain statements
made in the course of his conversations
with officers transporting him from the
Singer ranch to detention in Salt Lake
8, We note that the only piece of incriminating
evidence which resulted from Singer's recounting of the siege as he traveled to Salt Lake City,
and which arguably could not have been proven
in alternate fashion, was his admission that he
knew the police service dogs were accompanied
by human handlers. This evidence tended to
show recklessness in firing the rifle. Any error
in admission of this statement was probably
harmless. See generally Arizona v. Fulminante,
— U.S.
, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302
(1991).
We deem a trial error harmless when we
"may confidently say, on the whole record, that
the constitutional error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d
546, 555 (Utah 1987) (quoting Delaware v. Van
Arsdall 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct 1431, 1436,
89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)); State v. Bartley, 784
P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah App.1989). Thus, if after
excising the challenged evidence, we remain
convinced that a conviction would have followed, we find the lower court's ruling to be
harmless error.
After arriving in Salt Lake City, Singer was
interviewed by investigators from the Utah Attorney General's Office. Prior to the interview,
they readministered the Miranda admonition
and Singer once again acknowledged that he
understood his rights and would answer the
investigator's questions. In the course of this
more formal and ordered interrogation, Singer
made statements showing his awareness of the
officers and agents in the Bates house. It is
possible the second confession would be admis-

City.8 He claims that his confession was
given both involuntarily and in violation of
the requirement to scrupulously honor his
decision to remain silent Singer does not
allege that the conversation during which
he offered incriminating evidence was inherently coercive. Rather, he argues that
his confession was involuntary due to his
peculiar personal characteristics. Singer's
claims are premised entirely on the federal
constitution. We therefore confine our
analysis to federal law. See State v. Bobo,
803 P.2d 1268,1272 & n. 5 (Utah App.1990).
A. Voluntariness of Singer's Confession
[6] The "ultimate issue of Voluntariness' [of a confession] is a legal question."
Arizona v. Fulminante, — U.S.
, 111
S.Ct 1246, 1252, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)
(quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104,
110, 106 S.Ct 445, 449-50, 88 L.Ed.2d 405
(1985)). We review the totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness
of a confession.9 State v. Strain, 779 P.2d
sible under such circumstances even if the first
were not. See, e.g., Martin v. Wainwright, 770
F.2d 918, 929 (11th Cir.1985), cert, denied, 479
U.S. 909, 107 S.Ct. 307, 93 L.Ed.2d 281 (1986).
In any event, the evidence supporting recklessness was not limited to Singer's stated
awareness of officers' presence in the Bates
house. The jury was also shown photographs
and diagrams demonstrating that Singer's gunshots would likely penetrate into areas visibly
occupied by officers and others. The jury could
have easily relied on this evidence to conclude
that Singer acted recklessly.
9. Singer argues that among the factors in our
review we must examine the "age and intelligence of the witness, the place and conditions
under which the statement was made, the circumstances that invoked the conversation, as
well as the nature, content, and import of the
statement itself." State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572,
83 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1938), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d
178 (1943).
Singer also claims we must specifically weigh
personal characteristics beyond his intelligence
level, including his state of mind during the
questioning, and prior experiences with police
officers. He relies on State v. Hunt, 607 P.2d
297, 300-01 (Utah 1980). We note that the
discussion in Hunt was focused on the capacity
of a juvenile defendant to waive his or her
rights. Although Singer claims to be mildly
retarded and to function at a juvenile level, we
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221, 225 (Utah 1989). In Miller, the United
States Supreme Court held that confessions
may be involuntary "when the interrogation techniques were improper only because, in the particular circumstances of
the case, the confession is unlikely to have
been the product of a free and rational
will." Miller, 474 U.S. at 110, 106 S.Ct. at
449-50. See also State v. Hegelman, 717
P.2d 1348, 1350 (Utah 1986) ("Evidence sufficient to support a finding that a confession is involuntary must reveal some physical or psychological force or manipulation
that is designed to induce the accused to
talk when he otherwise would not have
done so."). In sum, we* scrutinize both
"the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation." Strain, 779
P.2d at 225 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct 2041,
2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)).
Shortly after his arrest, Singer was driven by two agents of the federal Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to facilities
in Salt Lake City. Singer was given a form
stating the Miranda rights and an agent
also recited the Miranda admonition. He
signed the waiver section of the form, indicating he understood his constitutional
rights, including the right to remain silent,
and agreed to speak with the agents. After a few minutes of questioning, Singer
stated that he did not want to discuss the
bombing or the siege. The agents honored
his request and ceased questioning. The
agents then began to converse between
themselves about the length and stress of
the incident, expressing hopes for a speedy
reunion with their families in distant
states.10 Singer then interjected the stateneed not address this claim. In Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d
473 (1986), the Supreme Court rejected the "overborne will" analysis of voluntariness of a confession. See discussion of Connelly, infra.
10. Singer claims that his decision to renew cooperation with the agents transporting him was
motivated to some degree by a generalized question by one of the agents to the other concerning the history of the Singer clan's clashes with
various government agencies. However, the
record is far from clear as to any expression of
puzzlement over the family's history. During
cross-examination, one of the agents stated that

ment that he was surprised the agents had
come to Utah from other states. He commented on the stress and difficulty for his
own family, and offered a description of
some details of the incident. Without restating the Miranda admonition, the
agents renewed their questioning. Singer
continued to answer their questions.
Singer claims to have been suffering, at
the time of the incident, from "clinical depression, which causes people to act"—in
his counsel's words—"recklessly." He alleges that federal agents used a subtle
form of coercion, to which he was particularly vulnerable. Singer concedes that
with another defendant, the agents' interrogation and comments would not have
produced an involuntary confession, but
adds that his peculiar background and lack
of socialization, stemming in part from
home education, rendered him uniquely
susceptible to subtle coercion and made
him extremely gullible. Singer produced
extensive expert psychological testimony
regarding these claims, although much of
the expert's testimony was effectively discredited by the State's own expert.
[7] The essence of Singer's claim of involuntariness is that his free will was overcome by the agents as they conversed regarding their families. The United States
Supreme Court, in Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473
(1986), eschewed a "free will" analysis of
voluntariness of confessions. The Court
stated that the sole concern underlying the
Fifth Amendment is coercive tactics by
government agents. Id. at 169-70, 107
S.Ct at 522-24. The Court explained: "Mranda protects defendants against governthe other had used "words to [the] effect" that
he did not understand the "background of the
situation." The agent was unable to more precisely recall any comments on the Singer family
history. However, the other agent, who had
been responsible for asking the questions as his
partner took notes of Singer's responses, denied
making any comments regarding not understanding the background of the incident.
Both agents testified that Singer acted normally during the drive. They also stated that
Singer did not appear to be mentally handicapped in any way, nor did he appear to be
particularly distressed or overwrought.
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ment coercion leading them to surrender
rights protected by the Fifth Amendment;
it goes no further than that." Id. at 17071, 107 S.Ct at 523-24.
Both Singer and the State vigorously argued their respective positions regarding
Singer's peculiar degree of gullibility and
his mental state, presenting a battery of
testimonial mental health evidence. The
trial court determined that Singer's statements were not the product of coercive
tactics and were voluntarily made. We
find no error in this conclusion. However,
our inquiry cannot rest here; we must consider the closely-aligned issue of whether
Singer effectively invoked the privilege
against self-incrimination, and if so, whether the agents improperly disregarded his
assertion of that right when they undertook the conversation that led to Singer's
talking again.
B. Failure to Honor Singer's
Decision to Remain Silent
Singer asserts that the agents' discussion about the stress of being separated
from their own families is analogous to the
well-known "Christian burial speech" addressed in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977),
rev'd on other grounds, sub nom Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81
L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). In Brewer, detectives
transporting an accused child-murderer,
whom they knew to be a former mental
patient who held deep religious sentiments,
conducted a dialogue between themselves
concerning the indecency of the child victim
not receiving a Christian burial. Through
this subtle manipulation the detectives successfully enticed the defendant to reveal
the location of the body. The Court condemned the use of this interrogative technique and held it to be violative of the Sixth
Amendment since the defendant was represented by counsel at the time of the confession.
Despite Singer's religious beliefs and
claimed mental limitations, we find the circumstances of the conversation between
the two agents more closely aligned with
the events in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446

U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297
(1980). Innis was arrested shortly following the robbery of a cab driver by means of
a sawed-off shotgun. While driving the
suspect to the police station, three officers
conversed about the proximity of the arrest
to a school for handicapped children. One
officer commented that tragedy would ensue if a handicapped child were to find the
loaded shotgun, which had been presumably abandoned near the arrest scene and
had not yet been located. Innis told the
officers to turn the car around and he
would show them where the shotgun was
hidden. Id at 294-95,100 S.Ct. at 1686-87.
Innis challenged the admission of the shotgun at trial, relying on the Supreme
Court's decision in Brewer.
In Innis, concerned that Miranda's proscription against coercive interrogation
might be read too narrowly, the Court took
the opportunity to refine the definition of
"interrogation" as envisioned in Miranda.
The Court cited several indirect forms of
interrogation, such as contrived lineups, reverse lineups, and blame-transfer techniques, as discussed in Miranda, and noted
that Miranda protections extend "not only
to direct questioning, but also to its 'functional equivalent'" Innis, 446 U.S. at
300-01, 100 S.Ct. at 1689. The "functional
equivalent" of interrogation was defined as
including "any words or actions on the part
of the police ... that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90
(emphasis added). Although the question
of whether a statement or comment is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating
answer is an inquiry resolved from the
perspective of the defendant, id., it must be
resolved in light of the officers' knowledge
of the suspect's characteristics. See id. at
302-03, 100 S.Ct. at 1690-91.
The Innis Court concluded that Innis had
not been "interrogated" prior to his indication of the location of the shotgun. The
Court noted that the conversation included
no direct questioning of Innis. Id. at 302,
100 S.Ct. at 1690. Nor had Innis been
subjected to the "functional equivalent" of
interrogation. Unlike the profoundly reli-
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gious and mentally ill defendant in Brewer,
there was no indication that Innis "was
peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his
conscience concerning the safety of handicapped children. Nor [was] there anything
in the record to suggest that the police
knew that [Innis] was unusually disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest."
Innis, 446 U.S. at 302-03,100 S.Ct at 1690.
[8] Similar to Innis, the conversation
between the agents transporting Singer
was very brief, comprising only a few sentences of off-hand remarks. Singer claims
that because the bombing and siege resulted from difficulties experienced by his own
family, the agents' comments about "family" were purposefully intended to be the
functional equivalent of interrogation. We
disagree. The agents' comments can most
fairly be construed in the context of two
fatigued officers who had been working
long shifts at all hours of the day and
night, while separated from spouses and
children. Even when generously viewed
from Singer's perspective, nothing in the
record suggests that the agents' pining for
their own homes and families represented
anything other than what the trial court
concluded it was—the natural expression of
familial sentiment.
Singer's decision to relate the story of
the siege from his standpoint came within a
very few minutes of a full explanation and
recitation of his rights, accompanied by his
signed waiver. His change of heart followed a brief interpersonal exchange between the two agents—not a lengthy emotional discourse focused toward Singer.
The agents honored Singer's request to
remain silent and ceased questioning until
Singer injected himself into the conversation and voluntarily related his tale. We
hold that no violation of Singer's right to
remain silent occurred, as Singer voluntarily abandoned his privilege against self11. The State also urges us to follow the rule of
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46
L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), where the Supreme Court
held that a second interrogation following two
hours after the initial invocation of Miranda
rights, and addressing a crime unrelated to that
for which defendant was arrested, did not vio-

incrimination under circumstances
amounting to interrogation.11

not

CONCLUSION
Singer was properly convicted of manslaughter. The evidence presented was
sufficient to demonstrate that Singer acted
recklessly in firing the shot which killed
Lieutenant Fred House. Singer's statements to law enforcement officers were not
obtained through coercive interrogation or
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, Singer's conviction is affirmed.
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur.
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Defendant appealed from orders of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Scott Daniels, J., revoking probation and
revising wording of his original sentence.
The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that:
(1) defendant's 18-month probation period
was not tolled upon violation of probation,
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wording of defendant's original sentence to
stay imposition of probation after 18month probationary period expired.
late Miranda when a new set of warnings was
administered. Because we do not find Singer's
Miranda rights to have been violated we do not
reach this issue. However, we note that unlike
Mosley, Singer was given no second admonition
after he initiated conversation with the agents.

